michael rota
In a recent paper, William Hasker has responded to a paper of mine criticizing his argument for theological incompatibilism. In his response, Hasker makes a small but important amendment to his account of freedom. Here I argue that Hasker's amended account of freedom is false, that there is a plausible alternative account of freedom, and that the plausibility of this alternative account shows that Hasker's argument for theological incompatibilism relies on a dubious premise.
I'm grateful to William Hasker for his powerful and insightful response 1 to a paper of mine 2 criticizing his argument for theological incompatibilism (the view that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian free will). In my paper, I had argued that Hasker's views on free will and hard facts (in God, Time, and Knowledge) are inconsistent. In his response, Hasker corrected the inconsistency by modifying a certain aspect of his account of freedom. His original account included the following two claims: (FW) N is free at T with respect to performing A = df It is in N's power at T to perform A, and it is in N's power at T to refrain from performing A.
(P) In general, if it is in N's power at T to perform A, then there is nothing in the circumstances that obtain at T which prevents or precludes N's performing A at T.
Hasker's correction is to drop the last two words in (P), "at T." "Delete those words," Hasker writes, "and the contradiction disappears. For regardless of what N is doing at T, this need not in general either prevent or preclude N's performing A at some time subsequent (perhaps immediately subsequent) to T." 3 Thus, Hasker's amended account of freedom includes (FW) and 1 William Hasker, "Theological Incompatibilism and the Necessity of the Present: A response to michael rota," Faith and Philosophy 28:2 (April 2011), 224-229. [Henceforth, "response"] 2 michael rota, "A Problem for Hasker: Freedom with respect to the Present, Hard Facts, and Theological Incompatibilism," Faith and Philosophy 27:3 (June 2010), 287-305. (P 2 ) In general, if it is in N's power at T to perform A, then there is nothing in the circumstances that obtain at T which prevents or precludes N's performing A. In what follows I argue that Hasker's amended account of freedom is false, and that a plausible alternative account of freedom is available. I then point out that the plausibility of this alternative account renders dubious a premise needed for the success of Hasker's argument for theological incompatibilism.
I. An Interesting Consequence of Hasker's Views
Before proceeding to a close examination of Hasker's new account of freedom, I want to note an interesting consequence of the account. Hasker rejects (7) For some human agent N, some act A, and some time T, N performs A at T, and N is free at T with respect to performing A.
Thus, he affirms
(11) For any human agent N who performs an act A at some time T, N is not free at T with respect to doing A at T.
But Hasker also holds that some acts are free; suppose A, which N does at T, is one such act. According to Hasker, N is not free at T with respect to performing A at T. But this entails that at T, N is not free with respect to the free act N is performing! In my earlier paper, I took this apparently contradictory entailment to be a problem for Hasker's account. 4 But, thanks to Hasker's reply, I now see that I was wrong to do so. A defender of Hasker's account can say that any appearance of a contradiction here arises merely from the fact that our everyday language about freedom is imprecise. And when we make our language precise, we're left with a coherent account, which Hasker sketches as follows: (FW) . . . gives a good account of what it is for a person to be free with respect to performing some action, but it is a distinct question what it is for an act to be free. In this connection, I suggest we look once again at the quotation from Suarez. According to the philosophers he cites, the will is not free in the sense of (FW) at the very instant at which it is acting. However, these philosophers mention two other ways in which the will may very well be free at that instant, namely, "the sense that (i) the act proceeds from the freedom and indifference that the will had immediately before that instant or in the sense that (ii) at the instant in question the will has the power to desist from the act in the time immediately following that instant." These two alternatives (or the combination of the two) specify, I want to say, what is properly meant by saying that the act in question is a free act. 5 4 rota, "A Problem for Hasker," 293. 5 Hasker, "response," 227.
In addition to (FW) and (P 2 ), then, Hasker's amended account of freedom includes a claim stating what it is for an act to be free-something like this:
(Q 1 ) Where a human agent N performs an act A at a time T, the act A is free iff either (i) immediately before T, it was in N's power to perform A at T, and immediately before T it was in N's power to refrain from performing A at T, or (ii) at T, it is in N's power to refrain from performing A at the next instant.
Or perhaps 6 this:
(Q 2 ) Where a human agent N performs an act A at a time T, the act A is free iff (i) immediately before T, it was in N's power to perform A at T, and immediately before T it was in N's power to refrain from performing A at T, and (ii) at T, it is in N's power to refrain from performing A at the next instant.
So a free act A (occurring at T) counts as free not because the agent is at T free with respect to performing it, but because the act has a certain sort of history, and/or because it is up to the agent whether or not the act will be prolonged.
II. An Argument against Hasker's Amended Account of Freedom
In this section I'll argue against Hasker's amended account of freedom. But first I'll need to clarify the account on a certain point. More exactly, I'll now try to show that Hasker's account should include the following precisification of (P 2 ):
(P 3 ) Where T* is later than T, if it is in N's power at T to perform A at T*, then there is nothing in the circumstances that obtain at T which prevents or precludes N's performing A at T*.
7
Suppose that Nick (N) is on a solo spaceflight, millions of miles away from any other human. He is strapped in (with a seat belt) to a special chair equipped with electromagnetic shackles which, when activated, keep his wrists flat against the armrests. (The chair is equipped with a timing system governing the activation of the shackles.) At T, the shackles are not turned on, and Nick is not lifting his arm. But the shackles are set to close at T1, the next moment Nick would have been able to act. 8 And they are 6
It is unclear to me from Hasker's comments at "response," 227, whether he intends Q1 or Q2.
7 For concision I've dropped the "in general" that begins Hasker's (P), which seems not to be playing any important role.
8 T1 is the first moment after T at which N would have been able to lift his arm, had there been no shackles. I assume here that there are a finite number of acts a human being could make in a given time interval. This is a way to make sense of Hasker's use of the concept of a time "immediately subsequent" to T ("Response," 225), without committing to the view that time itself is discrete rather than continuous. set to stay closed forever (due to a malfunction). Suppose further that the causal mechanisms in the timing system are such that it is at T already causally inevitable that the shackles will close at T1 and remain closed for the rest of Nick's life. Is it in Nick's power at T to lift his arm? On Hasker's principles, it is not in Nick's power at T to lift his arm at T (it's too late for that). And neither is it in Nick's power at T to lift his arm at T1, since at T1 the shackles will be on. 9 Nor is it in Nick's power at T to lift his arm at any time after T1, since, again, the shackles will be on. So, on Hasker's views, we should say that it is not in Nick's power at T to lift his arm.
But now let's change the scenario-say that the shackles aren't set to go on till T2, right after T1. So at T, the shackles are off, and at T1 they will be off. After that, they'll be on. Is it in Nick's power at T to lift his arm? Here we should clearly give a different answer-lifting an arm is now in Nick's power. Assuming Hasker's views, we should say that it is in Nick's power at T to lift his arm, precisely because it is in Nick's power at T to lift his arm at T1, although it is not in Nick's power at T to lift his arm at T2.
For Hasker's account to make sense of the difference between these two cases, a distinction needs to be made between the claims "it is in N's power at T to lift his arm at T1" and "it is in N's power at T to lift his arm at T2." Hasker's account thus requires locutions such as "it is in N's power at T to do A at T*," where T is distinct from T*.
(P 2 ) gives a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for "It is in N's power at T to do A," but does not state a necessary condition for "It is in N's power at T to do A at T*." extrapolating from (P 2 ), however, gives us (P 3 ) Where T* is later than T, if it is in N's power at T to perform A at T*, then there is nothing in the circumstances that obtain at T which prevents or precludes N's performing A at T*.
Henceforth I will take (P 3 ) to be part of Hasker's amended account. I now proceed to an argument against Hasker's amended account. First, I argue that the account should be modified by replacing (Q 1 ) and/or (Q 2 ) with a proposition I will creatively name (Q 3 ). I then make an argument against the account so modified.
A full account of freedom should have something to say about free omissions, as well as free acts. extrapolation from Q 1 and Q 2 gives us 9 consider this quotation from Hasker in God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: cornell University Press, 1989) : "The ascription of powers to finite agents is always subject to the possibility of interference. If I bump your elbow while you are shaving and cause you to cut yourself, this does not show that, on that occasion, you lacked the power to shave without cutting yourself. You had the power, but my interference prevented its exercise. (This assumes that my bumping your arm is not causally inevitable-if it were, then you would lack the power in question under those circumstances.)" (67, 1998 edition, italics in original). Also relevant: "If Thomas has the skill to perform on the parallel bars, but at T 1 his arms are tied behind his back, we shall say that he lacks the power at T 1 to perform on the parallel bars" (67).
(Q 1 *) Where a human agent N refrains from performing an act A at a time T, the omission ~A is free iff either (i) immediately before T, it was in N's power to perform A at T, and immediately before T it was in N's power to refrain from performing A at T, or (ii) at T, it is in N's power to perform A at the next instant, and (Q 2 *) Where a human agent N refrains from performing an act A at a time T, the omission ~A is free iff (i) immediately before T, it was in N's power to perform A at T, and immediately before T it was in N's power to refrain from performing A at T, and (ii) at T, it is in N's power to perform A at the next instant.
(Q 2 *), however, implies the false conclusion that N could not freely omit an act of will in the last instant of his existence. It seems possible that a human freely omit an act (say, an act of will) in the last instant of his or her existence. Suppose that God decided a day before T to annihilate N, 10 and T was to be (and was) the last moment of N's existence. Say that God's decision was firm, so that it was causally inevitable, for a whole day leading up to T, that N would not exist later than T. Now suppose that N was freely omitting an act A at T, as is possible. According to (Q 2 *), this would be impossible, because N would not satisfy clause (ii), which requires that at T, it be in N's power to perform A at the next instant. But since it is causally inevitable at T that N will not exist at the next instant, it is not in N's power at T to perform A at the next instant.
(Q 2 ) itself also seems too strict. Suppose that an instant before T, N has the two-way power with respect to A required by clause (i), and at T N performs act A. But further suppose that God has long since decided to causally ensure that N perform A at the instant after T. This would show that N's doing A after T is not free, but there is no reason to think that God's interference after T would remove N's act at T from the class of free acts. So it appears that (Q 2 ) implies the false conclusion that it is impossible for N's act A at T to be a free act if God is going to take over N's will immediately after T.
This leaves us with (Q 1 ) and (Q 1 *). It seems to me that, contrary to these claims, the satisfaction of clause (ii) is not sufficient for an act (or omission) to be free. Suppose, for example, that God creates N ex nihilo at T, in such a way as to ensure that at T N is in a state of thinking about but refraining from performing a certain act of choice A. So, at T, this first moment of N's existence, N omits A. But suppose that it is in N's power at T to perform A at the next instant. Is this enough to make N's omission at T a free omission? I don't see why it would be. On the contrary, it seems evident that N's omission at T is not a free omission. Through no choice of his own, N was simply created in a state of omitting A at T. To push this point further, suppose that at given instants in N's life, God periodically causally ensures that N omit A, no matter what N is doing before. So, for example, every minute God causes N to omit A, but just for an instant's time. (Q1*) would have it that those omissions are free as long as it is in N's power to do A at the next instant. But N would see these as interruptions of his own agency (if and when he noticed them). A similar counterexample to (Q1) can be constructed by supposing that God causally ensures N to perform an act A at certain instants.
Since clause (ii) is the source of the problems here, we can strengthen Hasker's amended account by dropping clause (ii), and replacing (Q 1 ) and (Q 1 *) with:
(Q 3 ) Where a human agent N performs an act A at a time T, the act A is free iff immediately before T, it was in N's power to perform A at T, and immediately before T it was in N's power to refrain from performing A at T, and (Q 3 *) Where a human agent N refrains from performing an act A at a time T, the omission ~A is free iff immediately before T, it was in N's power to perform A at T, and immediately before T it was in N's power to refrain from performing A at T.
Having given some additional precision to Hasker's amended account, and modifying it as above, I will now argue that the modified account is still inadequate. Consider the act of lifting an arm. Such an act occurs over an interval of time, and since we will be concerned with precise instants, let's consider the portion of such an act which occurs at a certain instant. Say that T is the first instant of the actuation of some particular muscles in N's arm. And call that actuation of the arm muscles act A. (We might describe A as an act of beginning to lift an arm.) Imagine that N is performing A at T. And suppose that the nerve impulse travelling from N's spine to N's arm, which occurs immediately before T (and which is causally responsible for the actuation of the arm muscles), together with the total circumstances immediately before T, make it causally inevitable that A will occur at T. Then it is not in N's power, immediately before T, to refrain from performing A at T. (It's too late for N to stop the chain of causation that is already in motion.) Thus, according to (Q 3 ), A cannot be a free act.
The medieval distinction between acts commanded by the will (like the act of lifting one's arm) and acts immediately elicited by the will (like the act of choosing to lift one's arm) is relevant here. Because the chain of causation between a state of will and a successfully performed commanded act may involve necessary causal links (or just be so fast that a person cannot voluntarily correct it mid-course), (Q3) will sometimes deliver the false conclusion that a commanded bodily act is not free, when it in fact is.
But there is a natural thing for a defender of Hasker's position to say here: we need to distinguish between (a) free commanded acts, which are derivatively free, in virtue of being caused by a free elicited act of the will, and (b) free elicited acts, like choices, which are free in a primary sense. And then we need to apply the general strategy incautiously expressed in (Q 3 ), in order to say what makes an act elicited by the will 11 free in this primary sense, as follows:
(Q 4 ) Where a human agent N performs an act of will α at a time T, the act is free iff immediately before T, it was in N's power to perform α at T, and immediately before T it was in N's power to refrain from performing α at T.
As for cases of omitting an act of will, we would have:
(Q 4 *) Where a human agent N refrains from performing an act of will α at a time T, the omission ~ α is free iff immediately before T, it was in N's power to perform α at T, and immediately before T it was in N's power to refrain from performing α at T.
I'll now argue that this account fails. Return to the example of lifting an arm, now letting T 1 be the time of the occurrence of A (the actuation of certain of N's arm muscles). If A is a free commanded act, A is derivatively free in virtue of being caused by a free act of N's will. As we trace the causal history of A (the first part of an arm lift) back, we must eventually reach an event in N's brain that was not causally necessitated by prior brain events-otherwise A would not be a free act. Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that this event involves a certain electron, e-suppose, in fact, that this event is the event of e's being in state S1 at T 0 . If e is in state S1 at T 0 , then it is causally inevitable, given the circumstances (and barring any intervention) that N will perform A at T 1 . But if e is in state S2 at T 0 , then it is causally inevitable, given the circumstances (and barring any intervention) that N will refrain from performing A at T 1 . Prior to T 0 , it might be that e will be in S1 at T 0 , and it might be that e will be in S2 at T 0 .
At this point a few careful distinctions will be needed. When N performs an act of will, N's will takes on (or remains in) a certain state. For example, when N performs the free act of choosing X, N's will is in a state of being directed to X in a certain way (the way characteristic of choice, rather than, say, mere wish). But for N to perform a free act of will, it is also necessary that N be the cause of his will's being in this state. If, because of some external influence totally outside of N's control, N's will ended up in the state of being directed at X in that same certain way, we wouldn't have a case of N performing a free act of will. For N to perform a free act of will, it is required that N cause his will to enter (or just be in) a certain state.
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Henceforth, I'll use "act of will" as shorthand for the more precise, but cumbersome medieval phrase "act immediately elicited by the will." Next, the phrase "N's act of will" is ambiguous between a state of N's will and N's action of causing that state of will (i.e., causing his will to be in that state). Henceforth I will use "N's act of will" to refer to N's action of causing some state of N's will.
We have supposed that if e is in S1 at T 0 , N will begin to lift his arm at T 1 . And we are supposing that if N performs a free act of will (of choosing to lift his arm), then the commanded act of beginning to lift his arm will be derivatively free. What is the relation between N's free act of will and e's being in S1 at T 0 ? A dualist might hold that N causes his will to be in a certain state, and his will's being in that state in turn causes e to be in S1 at T 0 . A materialist might hold that N's free act of will here just is N's causing e to be in S1 at T 0 . On this latter idea, e's being in S1 at T 0 is what we might call the "indeterminacy resolving event," 12 since before that event is posited, it is not yet determined that N will perform A at T 1 , but once it is posited, it is causally determined 13 that N will perform A at T 1 . On the former idea, the distinct state of will which causes e's being in S1 at T 0 would be the indeterminacy resolving event. my argument should go through either way, so for the sake of simplicity I'll henceforth assume (pretend, really) that e's being in S1 at T 0 is the indeterminacy resolving event, and that N's causing e to be in S1 at T 0 just is N's act of will.
It would be helpful to have a name for the event of e's being in S1 at T 0 -we could call it e S1 . Similarly, we could let e S2 name the event of e's being in state S2 at T 0 . But one final wrinkle must be smoothed. Contrast a situation in which N causes e to be in S1 at T 0 , and a situation in which something or someone else (and not N) causes e to be in S1 at T 0 . Do we have the same event in these two situations, or do we have two distinct token events of the same type? Some may hold that events are individuated in part by their causal origin. On that view, we should speak of events of the type e's being in S1 at T 0 , and say that if N is doing the causing, we have a particular token of that type. On the other hand, according to the view that events are individuated just by the objects, properties, and times involved, we would say that there is just one event here. I will side-step these issues by speaking of event e S1 , but inviting careful readers to substitute for e S1 the phrase "either the unique event of e's being in S1 at T 0 , if there is just one possible such event, or some event of the type e's being in S1 at T 0 , if there could be multiple tokens of that type."
Since we are supposing that N performs A at T 1 , we are also supposing that e S1 is what actually occurs. But either e S1 or e S2 might have occurred. We can illustrate the situation with the diagram below.
12 This way of characterizing such events was suggested to me by Alicia Finch. 13 Subject to the assumptions that (a) no pure chance events can derail the causal chain between the event of e's being in S1 at T 0 and act A and (ii) there will be no intervening action by free agents capable of acting fast enough to intervene in the causal chain between the event of e's being in S1 at T 0 and act A. Suppose, then, that the past (prior to T 0 ) is compatible with e S1 , and is compatible with e S2 . But at T 0 , e S1 occurs. What caused e S1 to occur? It was not necessitated (or deterministically caused) by prior events, since if it were it would not be the indeterminacy resolving event that we are supposing it is. Nor can we say that it was probabilistically (or indeterministically) caused by prior events, in such a way that it was a matter of chance that e S1 rather than e S2 occurred. (For if it was up to chance that e S1 occurred, then it was not up to N, and so A could not count as N's free act.) Nor can we say that e S1 has no cause, because then, again, we could not count A as N's own free act; rather, N would in that case be at the mercy of a spontaneous, uncaused event outside of his control. It seems most plausible, then, to say that e S1 must be agent-caused by N himself.
Next, when is e S1 actually caused by N? Not prior to T 0 , since nothing N does prior to T 0 settles whether E S1 or e S2 will occur. So N causes e S1 precisely at T 0 . This is a case of direct agent causation. e S1 occurs, and it is due to or caused by N instantaneously, and directly (not in virtue of N's causing something else which in turn causes e S1 ).
Both e S1 and e S2 are possible before T 0 , and although N wouldn't conceptualize it as such, up to T 0 it is in N's power to cause e S1 and it is in N's power to cause e S2 .
14 This is why, up to T 0 , it is in N's power to perform A at T 1 and it is in his power to refrain from performing A at T 1 . Then, at T 0 , N directly agent-causes e S1 , and this sets in motion a chain of events which culminates in N's performing the free (commanded) act A at T 1 . Let's call this case 1. Now compare case 1 to a second case, just like the first up to T 0 , but different at and after T 0 . In case 1, there is no time lag between N's choice and e S1 , because N's choice just is the instantaneous causing of e S1 ; at T 0 N directly and instantaneously causes e to be in S1. But if a creature can be so related to an electron as to be able to instantaneously agent-cause it to 14 It might be better to say "in N's power to bring it about that E S2 occurs" rather than "in N's power to cause e S2 ." The latter locution fits well if we imagine that causing E S2 is itself an act of will (a choice to not lift an arm). But we could also imagine that the occurrence of E S2 constitutes an omission of an act of willing to lift an arm, in which case the former locution is suitable. The example could no doubt be complicated to more perspicuously take into account the distinction between omitting an act of will and willing the omission of a commanded act, but doing so would, I think, be unnecessary for the argument I'll be making. Thanks to Matthews Grant for help on this point. be in a certain state, then an omnipotent God could be related to that electron in the same way. 15 On the view that events are individuated solely by the objects, properties, and times involved, I would word my claim here like this: God can directly, instantaneously 16 agent-cause the event of e's being in state S2 at T 0 . On the view that events are individuated in part by causal origin, I would word my claim like this: God can directly, instantaneously agent-cause an event of the type e's being in state S2 at T 0 .
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Furthermore, God could do this in a way which does not leave the matter in N's control in any way. God's causation of e S2 could amount to God's stepping in, so to speak, and authoritatively determining how things will be with respect to e at T 0 . Whereas God normally allows N to have a say in what happens to the electrons in N's brain, it is possible that God could act differently. In such a case, N would not be involved in the causation of e S2 at all.
Suppose God does this-this is case 2. At T 0 God instantaneously and directly causes e S2 to occur, and N has no control over the fact that God does this. The history of events in case 2 is identical to the history of events in case 1 up to T 0 , but in case 2 e S2 occurs at T 0 , and it is directly caused by God (and not by N). As a result, N does not perform A at T. Was this a free omission?
clearly not. Whereas N's act A is a free commanded act in case 1, N's omission of A in case 2 is not free (it's unilaterally guaranteed by God, and that God so guarantees it is a fact that is at no time in N's control). Similarly, N's omission, in case 2, of the act of will which consists in N's causing e S1 is not a free omission (it's unilaterally brought about by God, and that God so brings it about is at no time in N's control) . Yet Hasker's amended account gives the opposite answer. According to Hasker's account, what makes N's causing of e S1 (in case 1) a free act has entirely to do with facts that obtain before T 0 . N's act of causing e S1 (in case 1) is a free act because immediately before T 0 , it was in N's power to perform the act of causing e S1 at T 0 , and immediately before T 0 it was in N's power to refrain from performing the act of causing e S1 at T 0 . But the facts obtaining before T 0 are just the same in case 2 as they are in case 1. So in case 2, immediately before T 0 , it was in N's power to perform the act of causing e S1 at T 0 , and immediately before T 0 it was in N's power to refrain from performing the act of causing e S1 at T 0 . But then, according to (Q 4 *), it follows that in 15 For any electron in the universe, God is able to instantaneously and directly act on it, one would think. And the same should hold if, instead of an electron, we were talking about an immaterial faculty of will. I do not think God could unilaterally cause a free act of N's will, but God could unilaterally cause N's will to be in any particular state compatible with the nature of the will.
16 God would not need to first make a choice to intervene (at T -1 , immediately before T 0 ), and then cause e S2 to occur at T 0 . rather, God could instantaneously cause e S2 to occur.
17 I am not here making the claim that God could cause N's act of will-that would be to claim that God could cause N's causing of e's being in a particular state at T 0 . I am only claiming that God could cause the physical event of e's being in a particular state at T 0 , or an event of that type. case 2, N's refraining from performing the act of will e S1 is a free omission. So (Q 4 *) gives the false conclusion that (in case 2) both N's refraining from causing e S1 at T 0 and N's omission of A at T 1 are free omissions.
In case 1, N's causing of e S1 is a free act, but in case 2 N's omission of causing e S1 is not free. There must be a difference between the two cases which accounts for this. But what that difference is has nothing to do with times before T 0 , since the past up to T 0 is the same in both cases. The difference, it seems to me, is that in case 2, N lacks at T 0 the power to cause e S1 , because of an external influence, over which N has no control, whereas in case 1, the only reason to think N lacks at T 0 the power to cause e S2 is that, given N's own free causation of e S1 , N's ability to cause e S2 is precluded.
III. Diachronic vs. Synchronic Accounts of Contingency
Having argued against Hasker's amended account of freedom, I'll now defend the account I favor, according to which there are some acts we perform, such that it is in our power to not perform them, even at the time we perform them. (And the same for omissions, mutatis mutandis.) Against this view, Hasker brings up an example in which he is freely talking with you, and then realizes he shouldn't be saying what he is in the process of saying ("response," 226); he points out that it is absurd "to insist that, in order for [this] act to be free, it must be possible for me to bring it about that at the very instant when I realize that my present action of talking to you is inappropriate, it should already be the case that I am no longer talking with you" ("response," 227). I concede that this is absurd, but deny that it counts against my arguments. Note that Hasker's example here is a commanded act of the will, and one that takes time. When I take the view that some of the acts we perform are such that it is in our power (at the very time we perform them) not to perform them, I'm thinking of acts immediately elicited by the will, like choices.
18 And I'm thinking of these acts as acts that occur at a single instant of time.
19 So Hasker's example as presented does not tell against the account of freedom I wish to defend. Of course, one could raise a similar challenge with respect to an elicited act of will. Suppose that at T 0 N performs an act of will, say, a choice c. Someone taking Hasker's view could say that it is absurd and in no sense true that (r) At T 0 , it is in N's power to refrain from performing c.
I deny that this is absurd, and will now try to motivate a view of free will which affirms (R), when (R) is properly interpreted.
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I didn't make this clear in my earlier paper, so it is no fault of Hasker's that his argument doesn't address precisely the right target.
Hasker holds what historians of medieval philosophy have called a diachronic analysis or account of contingency (one apparently also adopted by Ockham), and he rejects the synchronic account of contingency held by Scotus, Suarez, and others. 20 According to the diachronic account of contingency (as applied to the contingency involved in free human action), a human being has two-way power only with respect to a future act. So, for example, at T -1 earlier than T 0 , it is in N's power to perform the act of will c at T 0 , and at T -1 it is in N's power to refrain from performing c at T 0 . On the synchronic account of contingency, in cases of freely elicited acts of will, humans have this sort of two-way power even at the temporal instant of the act. The key to the synchronic account is a distinction between temporal priority and metaphysical or explanatory dependence. even at a given instant of time, N's act depends on N's power to perform that act, and so N's power to perform c at T 0 is metaphysically prior (i.e., prior in the order of dependence or explanation) to N's act c at T 0 . And if this is correct, then within one and the same instant of time, we can distinguish between the stage in the order of dependence at which N has the power to perform the act c, and the stage in the order of dependence at which N exercises that power. There is no temporal gap between these two stages, of course; the point is just that since N's act at T 0 depends on N's having the power at T 0 to act at T 0 , N's power to act is in an important sense prior to N's act. Using the phrase "natural priority" to refer to this sort of priority, Suarez explains his synchronic account as follows:
The authors of [the diachronic account] err in not distinguishing between temporal priority and natural priority. . . . Thus, at the very instant it elicits a free act, [but] prior in nature to eliciting it, the will is thought of as having the power to elicit the act; and it is next thought of as eliciting the act by that power. Therefore, prior in nature at that same instant the will must be thought of as being capable of eliciting such an act and capable of not eliciting it-otherwise, it is not really being thought of as free to elicit the act. This is confirmed and clarified as follows. In the time immediately preceding the instant in question, the will is assumed to have the power to elicit the act and the power not to elicit it. And at the instant itself, naturally prior to the faculty's determining itself to the act, nothing has taken away its power not to elicit the act. Therefore, the will retains its twofold power at that instant, and by that power it either elicits or does not elicit the act at that very instant. Therefore, if the will is taken simply and absolutely at that instant along with all the prerequisites for acting, then it is really able at that instant not to elicit the given act. '" Modern Schoolman 72 (1995), 169-174. 21 Francisco Suarez, On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19, trans. A. J. Freddoso (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), disputation 19.9.4, p. 380. Let's apply this last argument of Suarez's to the present example: As time draws nearer to T 0 , N has a twofold power with respect to performing c at T 0 . When T 0 itself becomes present, N still has the power to perform c at T 0 . Has N lost the power (at T 0 ) to refrain from performing c at T 0 ? Given that we are assuming c is a free choice, the only thing that removes, in any sense, N's power to refrain from performing c at T 0 is the actual exercise of N's power to perform act c. So it is only consequent upon N's own free exercise, at T 0 , of the power to perform c at T 0 that N loses the power to refrain from performing c at T 0 . But then prior to N's free exercise of the power to perform c at T 0 (that is, prior in the order of dependence to N's performance of c at T 0 ), N still has the power to refrain from c at T 0 . And just as, within the same instant of time T 0 , we can say that N's performing c is prior to N's losing the ability to refrain from performing c at T 0 , so too we should say that, within the same instant of time T 0 , N's power to refrain and N's power to perform c are prior to N's performing c. So at T 0 , prior (in the order of dependence) to N's performing c, N does have the power to refrain from performing c at T 0 .
One who holds this view will rightly concede that at a later stage or instant of nature within T 0 , N does not have the power to refrain from performing c, since at a later stage N's act c has already been posited. But at the first stage or instant of nature within the instant of time T 0 , it is in N's power to refrain from performing c. This is the sense in which a synchronic account of contingency affirms (R).
A point about the burden of proof is now in order. In the present dialectical context, it is Hasker who is trying to prove that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are incompatible. And so the burden of proof is on Hasker; to the extent that his argument relies on a dubious premise, his argument will fail. And as I see it, Hasker's argument does rely on a dubious premise-the premise that the synchronic account of contingency (as applied to human freedom) is false. Now, I don't claim to have shown that the synchronic account is true; I claim only that it is plausible. But since it is plausible, the premise that it is false is dubious.
I say that Hasker's account relies on the premise that the synchronic account is false based on the following chain of reasoning: Hasker has argued for theological incompatibilism. But if it is true that (7) For some human agent N, some act A, and some time T, N performs A at T, and N is free at T with respect to performing A, then Hasker's premises will jointly imply a contradiction (see "response," 225). So Hasker must deny (7) and affirm its contradictory, (11) For any human agent N who performs an act A at some time T, N is not free at T with respect to doing A at T.
It's then fair to ask why we should accept (11). At "response," 226, Hasker endorses this reasoning in support of (11): At T, N does A. So at T, N does not have the power to refrain from doing A at T. So N is not free at T with respect to doing A at T. But if the synchronic account is correct, this reasoning is flawed. For the synchronic account implies that, where A is an immediately and freely elicited act of will, the fact that N does A at T does not imply that N does not have at T the power to refrain from doing A at T. rather, according to the synchronic account, N does have at T (at the first instant of nature) the power to refrain from doing A at T. And so it does not follow that N is not free at T with respect to doing A at T. Thus, Hasker will need to assert the falsity of the synchronic account in order to shore up his reasoning in support of (11). The upshot of all this is that Hasker will need to rely on the doubtful claim that the synchronic account is false (unless he leaves (11) unsupported, in which case (11) will be dubious).
IV. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Free Act
According to the Synchronic Account I've rejected Hasker's views on necessary and sufficient conditions for a free act, but haven't yet offered anything in their place. I propose the following: Suppose N performs an act of will c, and suppose N's performing this act of will consists in N's directly causing an event e (which is a state of N's will). This act has a location in the temporal order, and a location in the order of explanation or dependence. Suppose the former is T 0 , and the latter is IN i (for the ith instant of nature). N's power to perform c is explanatorily prior to N's performing c, and so we can say that N's power to perform c at T 0 is 'located' at T 0 , but at an instant of nature prior to IN i . Located at a possibly distinct instant of nature, but also prior to IN i , we will find both God's concurrence with N's performing C (i.e., God's giving whatever is required on God's part to allow N to exercise a power to perform c at T 0 ), and God's concurrence with N's refraining from performing c (i.e., God's giving whatever is required on God's part to allow N to refrain from performing c at T 0 ). And because N's lacking the power to refrain from performing c at T 0 is consequent upon N's performing c at T 0 , we should place N's lack of a power to refrain from c at T 0 at an instant of nature later than IN i . call the elements which are explanatorily prior to N's performance of c at T 0 the factors upstream in the order of explanation from IN i . Then, N performs c at T 0 freely iff (i) N directly causes e at T 0 , at IN i , and (ii) all factors upstream in the order of explanation from IN i are compatible with N's directly causing e at T 0 , at IN i , and all those factors are also compatible with N's not directly causing e at T 0 , at IN i , and (iii) that N causes e, rather than not, is not due to chance. Next, the free acts of will which an agent N performs are just those acts which N performs freely. As for omissions: Let IN i name the stage at which N does not directly cause e at T 0 . Then, N omits c at T 0 freely iff (i) N does not directly cause e at T 0 , at IN i , and (ii) all factors upstream in the order of explanation from IN i are compatible with N's directly causing e at T 0 , at IN i , and all those factors are also compatible with N's not directly causing e at T 0 , at IN i , and (iii) that N does not cause e, rather than does, is not due to chance.
This definition is immune to the problem I raised for Hasker's account at the end of section two, since in any case where God unilaterally causes e S2 at T 0 , so that N does not directly cause e S1 at T 0 , condition (ii) will not be satisfied, and so N's omission of C (i.e., N's omission of the act of will which consists in directly causing e S1 ) will not count as free. God's causation of e S2 at T 0 would be upstream in the order of explanation from N's not's causing e S1 , and incompatible with N's causing e S1 .
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Perhaps Hasker could fix his account of freedom, to deal with the counter-example I raised at the end of section two, by adding a clause or two ruling out certain freedom-precluding occurrences at the time of the act. So, for example, where N omits an act of will c, and N's performing c would have consisted in N's directly causing an event e at T, a proposed (Q 5 *) might have it that N's omission of C is free iff (i) immediately before T, it was in N's power to directly cause e at T, and (ii) immediately before T it was in N's power to not directly cause e at T, and (iii) nothing and no one other than N ensures at T that N refrain from directly causing e at T, and (iv) that N refrains from directly causing e at T is not due to chance. This account would evade my counter-example, because of clause (iii).
Were Hasker to take this route, however, he would seem to be conceding that if God at T ensured that e not occur, N's omission would thereby be unfree (even though N did have the requisite two-way power immediately before T). But then Hasker would be conceding that a proper analysis of freedom requires a consideration not only of the factors leading up to the act or omission in the temporal order, but also of the temporally simultaneous elements in the explanatory order at the time of the act or omission. So Hasker would be accepting the validity and importance of the distinction between priority in the temporal order and priority in the order of explanation. And once this distinction, which is the essential conceptual tool used to build the synchronic account, is accepted, a principled denial of the synchronic account will be difficult to sustain. Thus, if Hasker were to take the route mentioned, the problem relating to the burden of proof raised in section three would be all the harder for him to solve.
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22 To fill out this story we might add that the way in which God unilaterally causes E S2 is by refraining to sustain N's powers over e, and by causing e S2 . So in the order of explanation, all at T 0 , we have: God refrains from sustaining N's power to cause e S1 , and from sustaining N's power to cause e S2 ; God causes e S2 ; and all these factors are explanatorily prior to N's not causing e S1 .
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